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STATUTORY CLAIMS UNDER
ERISA: IS ARBITRATION THE
APPROPRIATE FORUM?
Southside Internists Group PC Money Purchase
Pension Plan v. Janus Capital Corp.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 2
provides a regulatory scheme for the myriad of employee benefit plans that affect
so many workers and their families today.3 One ERISA issue is whether claims
under the Act may be arbitrated or if they must be heard in a judicial forum. The
Supreme Court has not yet spoken on this issue, but the district court in Southside
Internists Group PC Money Purchase Pension Plan v. Janus Capital Corp. relied
on the Supreme Court's determinations of arbitrability in various other cases 4 to
conclude that ERISA claims may be arbitrated .
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
This case concerned a contract dispute between the plaintiffs, Southside
Internists Group PC Money Purchase, and other individual members of the plan,
6
and defendant Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.7 The individual plaintiff members
contracted with defendant Janus Capital Corporation to have Janus invest and
manage the assets of the plan.8 Janus and/or the plaintiffs hired defendant
Shearson to handle the transactions undertaken on behalf of the investment plan.
9
Shearson entered separate contracts with the individual plaintiffs,10 each of
which contained compulsory arbitration clauses. 1  The plaintiffs alleged
1. 741 F. Supp. 1536 (N.D. Ala. 1990).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
3. Id. § 1001(a).
4. Southside Internists, 741 F. Supp. at 1539-42.
5. Id. at 1542.
6. Id. at 1536.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1537.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. That clause read:
Unless unenforceable due to federal or state law, any controversy arising out
of or relating to my accounts, to transactions with you, your officers,
1
Brice: Brice: Statutory Claims under ERISA:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 1991, No. 1.
mismanagement of their investments by the two companies, and thus sued both
Janus and Shearson. 12 Shearson moved to stay the proceedings with regard to
it13 and to compel arbitration under section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act
14
pursuant to the arbitration clauses contained in the contracts. 15  Plaintiffs
contested the motion, asserting their right to a jury trial 16 to determine the
arbitrability of their claim based on three separate theories. 17 Those theories
were based upon contentions that (1) Shearson waived its right to arbitrate; 18 (2)
that the arbitration clause was an unenforceable adhesion contract; 19 and (3) that
statutory claims made under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 are not arbitrable. 20 The court found that the plaintiffs' first two allega-
tions were meritless.21 Thus the District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama, Southern Division, focused on the relatively novel 22 question of the
arbitrability of ERISA claims.23 The court concluded that there was no adequate
directors, agents and/or employees for me or to this agreement or the breach
thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules then in
effect of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. or the Boards
of Directors of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and/or the American
Stock Exchange, Inc. as I may elect. If I do not make such election by
registered mail addressed to you at your main office within 5 days after
demand by you that I make such election, then you may make such election.
Judgment upon any award rendered by the arbitrator may be entered in any
court having jurisdiction thereof.
Id. n.1.
12. Id. at 1537.
13. Id.
14. Federal Arbitration Act 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988).
15. Southside Internists, 741 F. Supp. at 1537.
16. Id. Section 4 of the Arbitration Act provides in part:
If the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal
to perform the same be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the
trial thereof .... Where such an issue is raised, the party alleged to be in
default may, except in cases of admiralty, on or before the return day of the
notice of application, demand a jury trial of such issue, and upon such
demand the court shall make an order referring the issue or issues to a jury
in the manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or may
specially call a jury for the at purpose.
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988).




21. Id. at 1538.
22. Three of the circuits that have spoken on the question of the arbitrability of ERISA claims are:
Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d 923 (3rd Cir. 1985); Bird v. Shearson Leh-
man/American Express, Inc., 871 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1989), vacated, _ U.S. _, 110 S.Ct. 225
(1989); Amulfo P. Sulit, Inc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 847 F.2d 475 (8th Cir. 1988).
23. Southside Internists, 741 F. Supp. at 1539.
2
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showing of congressional intent 24 to preclude waiver of the judicial forum for
ERISA claims and therefore statutory ERISA claims are arbitrable. 25
I1. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Since there has been no Supreme Court ruling on the arbitrability of ERISA
claims the instant court examined other cases ruling on the arbitrability of statutory
claims.26 In Wilko v. Swan,27 one of the first cases addressing the issue of the
arbitrability of statutory claims,28 the Supreme Court held that Securities Act
29
claims were not arbitrable 3° because arbitration was less effective in applying
the provisions of the Act.3 1 The Court based its finding on the weaknesses of
arbitration,3 2 including the possibility of an arbitrator's inability to understand
and correctly apply the statute.33 The Court's holding in Wilko was precedent
disfavoring the general arbitrability of statutory claims.34 However, the current
Supreme Court has since described that holding as being "pervaded by . . . 'the
old judicial hostility to arbitration."' 35 Thus the Court overruled its previous
finding of non-arbitrability for securities claims in Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc.
36
After Wilko and before the Supreme Court's most recent case in this area,
Rodriguez de Quijas, the federal courts broadened their application of arbitration
to statutory rights, following the federal policy favoring arbitration. 37  The
current test for arbitrability of statutory claims, set out in Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon,38 evidences the development of the courts' view of
arbitration since Wilko. That test is premised on the view that statutory
agreements are arbitrable, in accordance with the federal policy favoring
24. Id. at 1541-42. The court pointed out that the language granting federal court jurisdiction was
held not to evidence the required congressional intent to preclude ERISA claims from arbitration. Id.
at 1541 (citing Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989)).
25. Id. at 1542.
26. Id. at 1539-41.
27. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
28. Id. at 430.
29. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1988).
30. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
31. Id. at 435-38.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 436-37.
34. See id. The Court's ruling in Wilko amounted to a condemnation of the abilities of arbitrators
to settle statutorily-based claims. See Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 481, 109 S.Ct. at 1920.
35. Rodriquez v. Quijas, 490 U.S. at 480, 109 S.Ct. at 1920 (quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co.
v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942)).
36. Id. at 1922.
37. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
38. Id. at 226-27.
1991]
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arbitration, unless Congress intended otherwise. 39 A court can find evidence of
Congress' intent in the text of the statute, the statute's legislative history, or the
"inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying purposes."
40
Therefore, in the absence of a Supreme Court decision on the arbitrability of
ERISA claims, we can only look to the courts' past opinions to attempt to
determine what qualifies as congressional intent to preclude waiver of the judicial
forum.
Prior to the passage of ERISA, the Supreme Court had begun to retreat from
its narrow view of arbitration as expressed in Wilko.4 1 However, the characteris-
tics of the rights protected by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act42 led the
Supreme Court to conclude that claims under that statute are not arbitrable, as
expressed in the case Alexander v. Gardener-Denver Co. 43 Specifically, Title
VII confers a non-waivable 44 right on an individual to have equal opportunity
for employment,45 which is not precluded by a prior contractual arbitration of
the same situation. 46  The Court's argument against arbitrability was further
strengthened by its finding that the federal courts have plenary powers to enforce
Title VII under the provisions of the Act itself.47 Alexander is an example of
possible characteristics of statutorily conferred rights which may outweigh the
federal policy favoring arbitration and therefore be held not arbitrable.
48
Thus was the development of the attitude toward arbitration of statutory
claims when Congress passed the Employment Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) in 1974.49 ERISA was passed in response to the rapid increase in
employee benefit plans 50 and out of Congress' desire to provide minimum
standards for such plans to protect employee interests.
5 1
The text of the statute is silent with regard to the role arbitration may play
in protecting employee rights arisingunder ERISA.52 However, the legislative
history reveals that the Senate version of ERISA contained a provision requiring
39. Id. The Court phrased it rather strongly by stating ".. . the Arbitration Act's mandate may
be overridden by a contrary congressional command." Id. at 226.
40. Id.
41. See generally Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
42. -Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1988).
43. 415 U.S. 36, 48-60 (1974).
44. id at 51-52.
45. Id. at 44.
46. Id. at 51-54.
47. Id. at 47.
48. Id. at 56. The Court also noted that arbitration is an inappropriate forum to decide questions
of discrimination under Title VII, since the arbitration is not bound by the requirements of the statute,
but by the intent of the parties expressed in their contractual agreement. Id. at 56-57.
49. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461.
50. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
51. Id.
52. 29 U.S.C. § 1132. The ERISA civil enforcement provision details who may bring suit under
ERISA in § 1132 (a) and gives federal court jurisdiction in § 1132 (e), (1). There is no mention of
alternative methods of dispute resolution in these provisions. Id.
[Vol. 1991, No. 1
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qualified benefit plans to provide an opportunity for arbitration of disputes arising
between the plan administrator and any participant. 53 The House of Representa-
tives deleted all reference to arbitration in the Act5 4 resulting in the current
version of ERISA. 55 Perhaps the removal of the arbitration language is a
message from Congress to the courts that ERISA confers rights which may not be
precluded from the judicial forum.
53. H.R. 4200, 93d Cong. 1st Sess., (1975) reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, 1883, 2096-98 (1976). That version
contained:
Sec. 691 ARBITRATION; CIVIL ACTIONS BY PARTICIPANTS AND BENEFICIA-
RIES.
(a) ARBITRATION PROCEDURE - Each employee pension benefit plan subject
to this part shall provide-
(1) a procedure for the fair and just review under the plan of any
dispute between the administrator of the plan and any participant or
beneficiary of the plan, and
(2) an opportunity after such review and a decision by the administra-
tor (or failure to make a decision within a reasonable period of time
by the administrator), for the arbitration of such disputes.
(b) CIVIL ACTIONS - A participant or beneficiary of such a plan may bring
a civil action in accordance with the provisions of section 693 of this Act in
lieu of submitting the dispute to arbitration under the plan.
(c) ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES - if a dispute under a plan is subject to
procedures established by collective bargaining for the resolution of such
dispute, the Secretary of Labor, upon written request by a plan administrator,
may waive the application of subsections (a). (b) and (e) to such dispute if
he determines that the procedures provided for are reasonably fair and
effective.
(d) APPUCATION OF LAW RELATING TO SECTION 301 OF LABOR MANAGE-
MENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 - The arbitration of disputes in accordance with
the requirements of this section, and judicial proceedings relating thereto,
shall be governed by the laws, decisions, and rule applicable to the
arbitration of disputes under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act, 1947.
(e) PAYMENT OF ARBITRATION COSTS - The cost of any arbitration
proceedings required under this section (including arbitrators' fees) shall be
paid by the plan under which the dispute arises, unless the arbitrator
determines that a participant's or beneficiary's allegations are frivolous and
assesses all or a portion of such cost to that party.
(1) INFORMATION AND ASSISTANCE - The Secretary shall inform participants
and their beneficiaries under plans to which this part applies of their rights
under this part. The Secretary is authorized to furnish assistance to such
participants and their beneficiaries in obtaining such rights.
(g) The Secretary shall prescribe rules and regulations necessary to carry out
this section.
IdL
54. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 328, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 5038, 5108.
55. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461.
5
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The Supreme Court concluded that such was the case with rights conferred
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 6 The Court held in Barrentine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.,57 that claims under that Act are not
arbitrable. 58 Similar to the reasoning in Alexander, the Court found that FLSA
rights are individual, unwaivable rights and thus best protected in the judicial
forum. 59 These two cases taken together seem to indicate that the Supreme
Court views individual, unwaivable statutory rights to be restricted to the judicial
forum.6°  Thus, perhaps similar rights under other statutes with the same
characteristics evidence congressional intent to preclude waiver of the judicial
forum under the current test and therefore would be held non-arbitrable. 61
The view favoring arbitration of statutory claims gained strength in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth.62 In Mitsubishi, the
Supreme Court held a claim under the Sherman Act63 to be arbitrable. 64 The
Court based its decision on the presumption in favor of enforcing contractual
choice of forum clauses and the federal policy favoring arbitration. 65 This
decision departed from past case law deeming antitrust actions as public interest
claims unsuitable for arbitration.66 The Court held the parties' agreement to
arbitrate "enforce[]able ... in accord with the explicit provisions of the Arbitration
Act."96
7
In Mitsubishi, the Court articulated the basis for the current test of
arbitrability of statutory claims when it stressed congressional intent to preclude
arbitration as the key to holding statutory claims non-arbitrable. 68 Although the
Court did not find such intent underlying the Sherman Act,69 this analysis set the
stage for the development of the current test of non-arbitrability. 70
56. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1988).
57. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
58. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 745.
59. Id.
60. See Alexander, 415 U.S. 36; Barrentine, 450 U.S. 728.
61. See Note, ERISA ARBITRATION-Participant in Unfunded Deferred Compensation Plan
Required to Submit Claim to Enforce Terms of Plan to Arbitration, 31 VILL. L. REV 1166, 1183
(1986); see generally Barrowclough v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d 923, 940-41 (3rd Cir. 1985)
(compares characteristics of statutory rights to determine arbitrability of statutory claims, but does not
apply the current test for statutory claim arbitrability).
62. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
63. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
64. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 640.
65. Id. at 631.
66. See, e.g., American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968);
Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974).
67. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 640 (quoting Scherk, 484 F.2d at 620).
68. Id. at 627-28. The Court stated the issue as being whether the congressional intent underlying
the statute was clear enough to counteract the congressional policy in favor of arbitration manifested
in the Arbitration Act. Id.
69. Id. at 631-37.
70. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226-27.
[Vol. 1991, No. 1
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The Supreme Court announced the current test in Shearson/American Express
Inc. v. McMahon.7 1 In holding that claims under the Securities Exchange Act
of 193472 and RICO73 claims are arbitrable, the Court found that a duty to
arbitrate is not diminished when one of the parties raises a statutorily based
claim. 74 The Court expanded the test of statutory arbitrability to specifically
include the examination of the underlying purposes of the statute and arbitra-
tion.75  If those purposes demonstrate an inherent conflict, arbitration is
precluded.76 The Court could find no congressional intent to exclude these
claims from the rovisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, and thus concluded they
were arbitrable.
The Supreme Court's most recent stand for arbitrability of statutory claims
came in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc.78 In Rodriguez
de Quijas the Court attempted to achieve harmony between McMahon and Wilko,
two decisions it found inconsistent. 79  It succeeded by formally overruling
Wilko.80 The Court characterized that decision as being based on a suspicion of
arbitration 81 and therefore invalid.8 2 With Rodriguez de Quijas, the Supreme
Court's view of arbitrability of statutory claims comes full circle and there now
exists an assumption of arbitrability that must be overridden by congressional
intent.8 3  The question becomes: are the rights conferred by ERISA, its
legislative history or its text evidence of congressional intent to preclude waiver
of the judicial forum so that ERISA claims are non-arbitrable?
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
It was from this ever-strengthening federal court position favoring arbitration
that the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
considered Southside Internists. The court first noted that the plaintiffs were
entitled to a jury trial on their allegation of waiver of arbitration84 along with
their characterization of the arbitration clause as a contract of adhesion, 85 if their
71. Id
72. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988).
73. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988).
74. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226.
75. Id. at 227.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 238.
78. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
79. Id. at 484.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 481.
82. Id. at 484.
83. See generally id. As mentioned before, the assumption of arbitrability is based on the Federal
Arbitration Act and is strongly deferred to by the courts. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226-27.
84. Southside Internists, 741 F. Supp. at 1538-39.
85. Id. at 1538.
1991]
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factual allegations raised a genuine issue under state law.86 Specifically, the
court stated that the plaintiffs' allegations must raise either the issue that the
making of the arbitration clause itself was adhesive, or that defendant waived the
clause.87 Addressing the allegation of waiver first, the court determined that
defendant Shearson had never directly refused plaintiffs' request to arbitrate
88
nor impliedly waived its right to arbitrate by not demanding arbitration before
plaintiffs filed their suit.89 The court stated the test for waiver of arbitration as
being any conduct inconsistent with the idea that the arbitration clause is in effect,
or any conduct that might be reasonably understood to indicate the party does not
intend to employ the arbitration agreement. 90  The court concluded that
Shearson's conduct in this case was not definitive enough to be considered a
waiver of arbitration, especially since any question as to waiver must be resolved
in favor of the arbitration agreement.
91
As to the plaintiffs' assertion that the arbitration clause itself was a contract
of adhesion, the court found that there were not any unusual circumstances making
the clause adhesive. 92 Since an arbitration contract is not inherently unfair, the
court deemed this clause valid.9 3 Even though the plaintiffs failed to discuss the
clause with the defendants prior to signing the contract, the court held that the
plaintiffs could not avoid their obligations under the contract. 94  The court
determined that the plaintiffs' other allegations of adhesion concerned the entire
contract between the parties; 95 thus those allegations must be determined in the
arbitration proceeding itself. 96 As Judge Nelson pointed out, a court considering
whether an arbitration clause is valid may only inquire into those issues
concerning the performance and making of the clause itself-not the contract in
general.97 Based on these findings, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were
not entitled to a jury trial on their first two contentions, having failed to raise a
genuine issue as to either point.
98
Turning to the arbitrability of the ERISA claim, the court stated that the test




89. Id. at 1538-39. The court pointed out that Shearson demanded arbitration immediately after
it was added as a defendant in the law suit. Nothing about the timing of the demand qualified as the
type of prejudice that rises to the level of waiver. Id. (quoting E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr.
Co., 559 F.2d 268, 269 (5th Cir. 1977)).
90. Id. at 1538.
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unless the federal policy favoring arbitration is overridden by congressional intent
to the contrary. 99 The court noted that it must decide whether or not Congress
intended to allow parties to waive the judicial forum for their claims. 100 The
court found that this intent may be determined from the legislative history,
underlying policies or text of the statute.
10 1
The court then examined the findings of other courts in different cir-
cuits.10 2 In a footnote, the court pointed out that the Supreme Court has
weakened two circuit court decisions holding ERISA claims to be non-arbitra-
ble. 10 3 In light of its holding in Rodriguez de Quijas,10 4 the Supreme Court
recently vacated10 5 the Second Circuit's holding in Bird v. Shearson Leh-
man/American Express, Inc. 1° 6 that ERISA claims are not arbitrable. 10 7 The
instant court also noted that the Third Circuit decision in Barrowclough v. Kidder,
Peabody & Co.,108 holding ERISA claims are non-arbitrable,10 9 was based
on reasoning the Supreme Court rejected in Mitsubishi, McMahon and Rodriguez
de Quijas.110
In this case the plaintiff argued that ERISA's provisions for exclusive federal
district court jurisdiction precluded arbitration of their ERISA claims. 1 The
court pointed out that the Supreme Court has rejected such an interpretation of a
virtually identical provision of the Exchange Act in McMahon.112 The court
of its own accord went on to catalog the various types of provisions which have
been rejected by the Supreme Court as proof of congressional intent to foreclose
waiver of the judicial forum. 113 Specifically it noted that the Supreme Court
has held provisions providing for broad venue, nationwide service of process,
diversity jurisdiction without a minimum amount in controversy, exclusive federal
jurisdiction and concurrent jurisdiction fail to provide the requisite congressional





102. Id. at 1539-41.
103. Id. at 1541 n.2.
104. Bird v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc.. 871 F.2d 292,298 (2d Cit. 1989), vacated,
U__ .S. _, 110 S.Ct. 225 (1989). The Bird decision finds congressional intent to preclude waiver
in the very types of provisions the Rodriguez de Quijas Court rejects as inconclusive of such intent.
Id. at 297.
105. Id. at 292.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 298.
108. 752 F.2d 923 (3rd Cir. 1985).
109. Id. at 941.
110. Soudlside Internists, 741 F. Supp. at 1540 n.2.
111. Id. at 1541 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)).
112. Id. (citing McMahon, 482 U.S. at 228).
113. Id.
114. Id. The court discussed these provisions in Rodriquez de Quijas, 460 U.S. at 477.
1991]
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Plaintiffs also contended that the arbitrator Shearson chose had no congressio-
nal authority to arbitrate ERISA violations.1 15 The court rejected this argument
as being irrelevant because an arbitrator derives his authority to settle disputes
from the contract between the parties. 1 6 Additionally, plaintiffs claimed that
since there was no arbitration agreement with Janus, "the primary ERISA
violator", the ERISA claims could not be arbitrated. 117 The court noted that
Shearson only wished to arbitrate plaintiffs' claims against it, 118 and that the
Federal Arbitration Act does not leave a court discretion to refuse enforcement of
an arbitration agreement solely because the issues to be arbitrated are not central
to the dispute.1 19 Therefore, the court found it immaterial to arbitrability that
Janus was the principle ERISA violator instead of Shearson. 120 Thus, lacking
a showing of congressional intent to preclude arbitration of ERISA claims, the
District Court held that such claims were arbitrable.
121
V. ANALYSIS
The holding in Southside Internists is very much in line with the current case
law, which almost universally favors arbitration of statutory rights.' 22 The
federal courts have not been quick to find congressional intent to preclude arbitra-
tion, 123 and the district court in Southside Internists followed suit by rejecting
the plaintiffs' contention that the federal jurisdiction provision of ERISA 124
evidences such congressional intent. 12
5
In deciding questions of arbitrability of statutory rights, courts are required
to balance the competing policy of the statute itself1 26 with the policy of the
Federal Arbitration Act.12 ' In the case of ERISA, there is at least some
indication that Congress intended for the courts exclusively to decide claims






121. Id. at 1542.
122. The previous discussion of case law demonstrates the favored position of arbitration in the
federal courts today. The two notable exceptions are Barrentine, 450 U.S. 728, and Alexander, 415
U.S. 36.
123. See generally McMahon, 482 U.S. 220; Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614; Rodriguez de Quijas, 460
U.S. 477.
124. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (e).
125. Southside Internists, 741 F. Supp. at 1541.
126. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227.
127. Id. at 226. The Court in Moses H-. Cone held that the Federal Arbitration Act establishes a
policy favoring arbitration. 460 U.S. at 24.
[Vol. 1991, No. 1
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arising under the statute. 128 This intent is evidenced in the previously discussed
removal of an arbitration clause from the Act before it was passed into law.
129
That removal could be interpreted to mean that Congress considered arbitration of
ERISA claims and then thought better of it.130  This evidence, though not
overwhelming, speaks fairly strongly of a congressional intent to preclude waiver
of the judicial forum for ERISA claims. However, at least one court found no
such congressional intent in the legislative history of the statute.
131
The interpretation courts such as the Eighth Circuit in Arnulfo P. Sulit Inc.
v. Dean Witter Reynolds132 give to the text of the statute and the statute's
legislative history is heavily influenced by the federal policy favoring arbitra-
tion. 133 This policy is so pervasive that unless the courts see the character of
the statutory right as unusually important, they will most probably hold the
statutory claim arbitrable. Examples of such unusually important rights are found
in the Barrentine and Alexander cases.
In holding FLSA claims non-arbitrable, the court in Barrentine pointed out
that this statutory claim concerns the health of individual workers 13 4 with the
characteristics of the rights before it. 135  The court contrasted the arbitrable
rights protected by the Labor Management Relations Act. 136 In Alexander the
issue was racial discrimination, 137 which is well known as an extremely
important issue to the courts. 138 ERISA does not protect the same sort of
fundamental right as the statutes interpreted in these two cases. It protects a right
that is crucial to many families, but is none the less merely monetary. Its
importance pales in comparison to the rights to health and protection against
discrimination. The type of right ERISA protects, taken in consideration with the
strong federal policy favoring arbitration dictates the outcome of cases like
Southside Internists. ERISA claims will probably go the way of most federal
statutory rights today and be held completely arbitrable. Thus, judicial economy
will be served by allowing the determination of most statutory claims through
arbitration, while the most fundamental types of rights will continue to be
protected by the courts.
AMY L. BRICE
128. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Scss. 328, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 5038, 5108. For the text of the arbitration clause of the Senate's version of ERISA,
see supra note 40.
129. Id.
130. Agreement for this interpretation can be found in Note, supra note 61, at 1178-80.
131. Sulit, 847 F.2d at 478.
132. Id. at 475.
133. See generally id. at 478; McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226-27.
134. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 739.
135. Id.
136. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1988).
137. Alexander, 415 U.S. 36.
138. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1966).
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